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ESTATE TAX SECTION 2040(c) AS A SOLUTION TO
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST SURVIVING
JOINT TENANT FARM WIDOWS
Joint tenancy and tenancy by the entirety are two of the most popu-
lar forms of real property ownership among married farm couples.'
Common-law principles generally govern the tenancy relationship al-
though survivorship in joint tenancy is statutory in a few states.2 The
primary reason for holding property in joint tenancy or tenancy by the
entirety,3 both of which have a survivorship feature, is to facilitate
transfer to the survivor upon the death of the first joint tenant.4 A sec-
ond reason for having a joint tenancy, which appeals to family-oriented
farming businesses, is that joint ownership reinforces family harmony
1. Hines, Real Property Joint Tenancies: Law, Fact, andFancy, 51 IowA L. RED. 582, 587-88
(1966). See also Bayse, Joint Tenancy: 4 Reappraisal, 30 CAL. S.B.A.J. 504, 506 (1966);
Campfield, Estate Planning For Joint Tenancies, 1974 DuKE L.J. 669, 670; Hartwig, Estate Tax
Consequences of Various Kinds of Property Holding by Husband and Wife: Joint and Recprocal
Wills, and Intestacy, 23 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 1093 (1965); Note, Estate Tax Section 2040:
Homemakers Contribution To Jointly Owned Property, 29 TAX LAW. 623 (1976).
Although there is frequent speculation, little data exists on exactly how much real estate is held
in joint tenancy. An excellent study was made in Iowa by Professor Hines of the University of
Iowa College of Law. The Iowa study showed that 40% of all farm transfers in 1964 were into
joint tenancy. Hines, supra, at 611. The study further showed that husband and wife grantees
account for virtually all of the farm joint tenancies. Id. at 619.
Farm couples' usage ofjoint tenancy increased dramatically in the post-depression years. Id. at
588-89. Possible reasons for increased popularity in this time period are that lending farm credit
institutions were selling farmland that they had acquired through foreclosure proceedings to hus-
band and wife co-owners. This allowed avoiding fragmentation of title by having the property put
into joint tenancy with right of survivorship. In addition, before the joint income tax return
couples would decrease their income tax burden by splitting the income from income-producing
property by dividing the ownership of the property. Another factor that might have been partially
responsible for the surge of joint tenancies in the early 1940's was patterning ownership after the
war bond, which had a built-in survivorship feature. Id.
2. E.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 76, § 1 (1963); WASH. REy. CODE ANN. § 64.28.010 (1966). See
generally Hines, supra note 1, at 596; Mann, Joint Tenancies Today, 1956 U. ILL. L.F. 48, 64-65.
3. A tenancy by the entirety is distinguished from a joint tenancy in several respects:
(I) [I]t may be created only between husband and wife; (2) neither spouse can alienate or
transfer his interest in the subject premises without the consent of the other tenant by the
entirety, (3) not all states recognize tenancy by the entirety; and (4) of those states recog-
nizing tenancy by the entirety, the majority restrict it to real property.
Campfield, supra note I, at 684. See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.6 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952);
C. LOWNDES & R. KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES § 11.1, at 230 (2d ed. 1962); C.
MOYNIHAN, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 230-35 (1962); 4A R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROP-
ERTY 1 621 (1979).
4. See Hines, supra note 1, at 596.
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and the partnership notion associated with marriage.
Substantial estate tax problems can arise when farm couples create
joint tenancies in real estate. The couple often reinvests the farm prof-
its back into the business, usually for the purpose of buying additional
real estate. The rapid appreciation in value of this real estate6 can have
adverse estate tax consequences: Unless the survivor can show that he
or she contributed to the acquisition of the property, the full value of a
joint tenancy property interest is subject to taxation as part of the estate
of the first joint tenant to die.7
Under the "contribution furnished" test,8 it is especially difficult for
a surviving farm wife who is not a wage earner9 having a separate
source of funds to prove contribution. 10 With few exceptions, courts
refused to recognize a wife's work on the family farm'" as a contribu-
5. See Campfield, supra note 1, at 671 n.3. Other advantages of joint tenancy include: (1)
Avoiding fragmentation of ownership; (2) avoiding probate delays; (3) freeing the property from
the claims of creditors of either spouse; (4) reducing administration costs; (5) enjoying preferential
treatment for state death tax purposes; and (6) having the convenience of the automatic operation
of the survivorship right. Id. See also Hines, supra note 1, at 595-98; Werig, Joint Property:
Spouses' Expectations and Estate Planners' Assumptions, 116 TR. & EST. 516, 520 (1977); 43
U.M.K.C. L. REv. 60, 61-63 (1974).
6. To illustrate the rapid appreciation in farmland prices, the price of Illinois farmland in-
creased 620% between 1960 and 1979. U.S. DEP' OF AGRICULTURE, FARM REAL ESTATE MAR-
KET DEVELOPMENTS (March 1979).
7. I.R.C. § 2040(a). The subsection provides as follows:
JOINT INTERESTS
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property to the extent of the
interest therein held as joint tenants by the decedent and any other person, or as tenants
by the entirety by the decedent and spouse, or deposited, with any person carrying on the
banking business, in their joint names and payable to either or the survivor, except such
part thereof as may be shown to have originally belonged to such other person and never
to have been received or acquired by the latter from the decedent for less than an ade-
quate and full consideration in money or money's worth: Provided, That where such
property or any part thereof, or part of the consideration with which such property was
acquired, is shown to have been at any time acquired by such other person ....
Id. See also Hines, supra note I, at 599; Uchtmann, Planning Agricultural Estates: The Impact of
Estate and Gift Tax Sections of the 1976 Tax Reform Act, 1977 S.I.U. L.J. 393, 399-400; Note,
supra note 1, at 623-24; 43 U.M.K.C. L. REv. 60, 66 (1974).
8. See I.R.C. § 2040(a). Any further references to sections in the text will be to the appro-
priate sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as amended.
9. The designated roles of the husband being the person buying the farmland and the wife
materially participating in the farming operation is how most of the case law reads. This Note will
refer to the typical situation where husband and wife are in those roles, but this reference does not
mean to exclude the situation where the roles are reversed.
10. See Uchtmann, supra note 7, at 400.
11. References to wife's work on the farm is not a reference to domestic work done by a
homemaker but rather refers to efforts and skills in both physical work to produce crops or com-
modities and making management decisions. See notes 92-95, 113-14 infra.
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tion in money or money's worth.12 This view clearly discriminated
against the farm wife and ignored the realities of the normal family
farm operation in which both husband and wife work equally.
In 1978 Congress enacted section 2040(c)' 3 to end this discrimina-
tion. Section 2040(c) treats services provided by the decedent's spouse
in the operation of the farm or business as consideration for the pur-
pose of diminishing the value of the decedent's estate.
This Note will examine the problem of discrimination against farm
widows who are surviving joint tenants in three ways-first, by survey-
ing the development of the law on joint tenancy and the treatment of
the wife's work in the business as a contribution to the joint property;
second, by evaluating the effectiveness of section 2040(c); and finally,
by contrasting the results under section 2040(c) with possible judicial
solutions.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF JOINT INTERESTS
Property held in joint tenancy does not become part of the estate of
the decedent because, theoretically, each tenant owns the whole prop-
erty under this form of ownership. 14 In the absence of section 2040,
therefore, property held in joint tenancy would not be taxed in the es-
tate of the first joint tenant to die.15 Congress enacted section 2040(a)
to prevent the use of joint tenancies to avoid taxation.' 6 Under section
2040(a), the entire value of joint property is included in the decedent's
estate except that portion attributable to monetary consideration fur-
nished by the surviving joint owner. 17
The crucial inquiry for determining if property held in joint tenancy
is taxable in the decedent's estate is whether the survivor acquired the
property from decedent "for adequate and full consideration in money
12. See notes 25-42 infra.
13. I.R.C. § 2040(c).
14. See R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 615, 626 (1968); Note, supra
note 1, at 626 n.22.
15. See R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD & S. LIND, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION
I 4.12[1], at 4-233 (4th ed. 1978). Arguments supporting inclusion could be made, however, under
I.R.C. § 2037-dealing with transfers taking effect at death or I.R.C. § 2033-property in which
the decedent had an interest
16. I.R.C. § 2040(a) was enacted in 1916 as section 202(c). See Tyler v. United States, 281
U.S. 497, 500-01, 505 (1930).
17. See I.R.C. § 2040(a); Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-1(a)(2) (1958).
Number 1]
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or money's worth."'18 To make this determination, the funds used to
acquire the property are traced to their source. 19 One judicial excep-
tion to the general rule of section 2040(a) exists when the surviving
joint tenant furnished consideration consisting of income from capital,
the capital having been a previous gift from deceased joint tenant to
surviving joint tenant.20 The income from income-producing property
is considered as belonging to the donee-surviving joint tenant. Any of
the income applied to joint tenancy property is consideration furnished
by the donee-surviving joint tenant. This exception, however, has been
limited by the courts. When husband and wife each contributed cash
for the purchase of property in joint tenancy and the source of the sur-
vivor's contribution is a gift from the decedent prior to his death, the
contribution is traced back to the donor's gift and the entire value is
included in decedent's estate.2'
Similarly, courts have dealt with cases in which joint tenancy assets
were purchased subject to a mortgage upon which both joint owners
were personally liable. Joint tenants can treat satisfaction of a liability
18. This phrase is not defined in the Internal Revenue Code. The only direct statement on its
meaning is found in I.R.C. § 2043(b), which provides that the relinquishment of marital rights
shall not be treated as consideration in money or money's worth. For cases interpreting the phrase
see Commissioner v. Porker, 92 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1937); Commissioner v. Bryn Mawr Trust Co.,
87 F.2d 607 (3d Cir. 1936); Latty v. Commissioner, 62 F.2d 952 (6th Cir. 1933). See Note, supra
note 1, at 625.
19. See, e.g., Dimrock v. Corwin, 306 U.S. 363 (1939); Tuck v. United States, 282 F.2d 405
(9th Cir. 1960); English v. United States, 270 F.2d 876 (7th Cir. 1959); Swartz v. United States, 182
F. Supp. 540 (D. Mass. 1960); McCrady v. Heiner, 19 F. Supp. 575 (W.D. Pa. 1937); Bremer v.
Luff, 7 F. Supp. 148 (N.D.N.Y. 1933); Bowditch v. Commissioner, 23 B.T.A. 1266 (1931), rev'dby
stiulation, 62 F.2d 1065 (Ist Cir. 1933); Estate of Kelley v. Commissioner, 22 B.T.A. 421 (1931);
Dean, Federal Tax Consequences of Joint Ownerhsop, 53 GEo. L.J. 863, 864-67 (1965); Note, supra
note 1, at 625.
20. See Harvey v. United States, 185 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1950); First Nat'l Bank of Kansas
City v. United States, 223 F. Supp. 963 (W.D. Mo. 1963); Swartz v. United States, 182 F. Supp.
540 (D. Mass. 1960); Estate of Goldsborough v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 1077 (1978); Estate of
Howard v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 1192 (1947). But see Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-1(c) example 5
(1958); Estate of Selecman v. Commissioner, 9 T.C.M. (CCH) 997 (1950). See also Sugar, How
New Section 2040(c) Alters the Estate Tax Burden on Jointly Owned Property, 50 J. TAX. 270, 273
(1979); Note, supra note 1, at 625.
21. See Endicott Trust Co. v. United States, 305 F. Supp. 943 (N.D.N.Y. 1969) (limiting the
applicability of Harvey and First NationalBank ofKansas City to situations in which the decedent
had, prior to the acquisition of the jointly owned property, given property outright to the survivor
who subsequently sold that property and used the proceeds to invest in the newly acquired jointly
owned property). Accord, Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-1(c) example 4 (1958). See generally Dean, supra
note 19, at 864-67.
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as consideration when they are both liable for the mortgage.22 When
the income from the jointly owned property is used to pay off an out-
standing mortgage on which husband and wife are jointly liable, each
joint tenant is considered to have furnished contribution of one-half the
payments. 23 The premise behind this is that each joint tenant is enti-
tled to one-half the income from the property even though the property
was originally a gift from the decedent to the surviving joint owner.24
Another exception to the general rule of section 2040(a), which has
been carved out by the courts, is that services of the wife in a family
business are consideration for jointly held property when the profits are
used to purchase joint tenancy property. Activities of the wife that
have qualified as consideration include managing and handling invest-
ments in securities and real estate,26 clerking and doing office work in a
plumbing business,2 ' serving as a receptionist and office helper in a
husband's doctor office, 28 running a grocery store29 or other retail
store,30 and managing and operating a publishing company.3' Courts
also have recognized the wife's work on a family farm as consideration
22. See Bremer v. Luff, 7 F. Supp. 148 (N.D.N.Y. 1933) (even though there was no actual
proof of whether husband or wife actually paid the mortgage). See also 43 U.M.K.C. L. REv. 60,
68 (1974).
23. See Drummond's Estate v. Paschal, 75 F. Supp. 46 (E.D. Ark. 1947). See also Sugar,
supra note 20, at 273.
24. See Drummond's Estate v. Paschal, 75 F. Supp. 46 (E.D. Ark. 1947).
25. See United States v. Ned, 235 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1956); Ferry v. Rogan, 154 F.2d 974
(9th Cir. 1946); Rogan v. Kammerdiner, 140 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1944); Berkowitz v. Commissioner,
108 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1939); Richardson v. Helvering, 80 F.2d 548 (D.C. Cir. 1935); Craig v.
United States, 451 F. Supp. 378 (D.S.D. 1978); Singer v. Shaughnessy, 96 F. Supp. 506 (N.D.N.Y.
1951), af'd, 198 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1952); Estate of Ehret v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1432
(1976); Estate of Carpousis v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1143 (1974); Estate of Otte v.
Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 301 (1972); Estate of Trafton v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 610
(1956); Estate of Guiliani v. Commissioner, 11 T.C.M. (CCH) 673 (1952); Estate of Fletcher v.
Commissioner, 44 B.T.A. 429 (1941); In re Estate of Kersten, 71 Wis. 2d 757, 239 N.W.2d 86
(1976). But see Bushman v. United States, 8 F. Supp. 694 (Ct. Cl. 1934), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 756
(1935); Estate of Loveland v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 5 (1949); Estate ofAwrey v. Commissioner, 5
T.C. 222 (1945).
26. See Ferry v. Rogan, 154 F.2d 974 (9th Cir. 1946); Richardson v. Helvering, 80 F.2d 548
(D.C. Cir. 1935); Estate of Trafton v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 610 (1956).
27. See Estate of Ehret v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1432 (1976).
28. See Estate of Carpousis v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1143 (1974).
29. See Berkowitz v. Commissioner, 108 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1939).
30. See Rogan v. Kammerdiner, 140 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1944); Estate of Guiliani v. Commis-
sioner, II T.C.M. (CCH) 673 (1952).
31. See Singer v. Shaughnessy, 96 F. Supp. 506 (N.D.N.Y. 1951), af'd, 198 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.
1952).
Washington University Open Scholarship
230 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 59:225
for jointly held property.32
When determining if the wife's work qualifies as consideration,
courts first inquire whether she made any capital contribution to the
start of the business. 33 Failure of the wife to make a contribution to the
start of the business, however, is not fatal to allowing contribution.34
Courts also determine whether profits from the business are put into
jointly owned property or joint bank accounts. 35 It is important that
there is some sort of profit sharing agreement between the husband and
wife. 36 It need not be a legal partnership agreement or even be in writ-
ing,37 but the agreement must show that the couple understood that the
profits were to be shared. 38  The courts also examine the length of time
that the husband and wife have worked together in the business3 9 as
32. See United States v. Neel, 235 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1967); Craig v. United States, 451 F.
Supp. 378 (D.S.D. 1978); Estate of Otte v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 301 (1972); In re
Estate of Kersten, 71 Wis. 2d 757, 239 N.W.2d 86 (1976). For a thorough analysis of these farm-
ing cases see notes 97-124 infra and accompanying text.
33. See Berkowitz v. Commissioner, 108 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1939); Singer v. Shaughnessy, 96
F. Supp. 506 (N.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd, 198 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1952); Estate of Carpousis v. Commis-
sioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1143 (1974); Estate of Guiliani v. Commissioner, 11 T.C.M. (CCH) 673
(1952).
34. See Craig v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 378 (D.S.D. 1978) (decedent husband inherited
first piece of farmland, profits from which were used to buy other farmland).
35. E.g., Singer v. Shaughnessy, 96 F. Supp. 506 (N.D.N.Y. 1951), af'd, 198 F.2d 178 (2d
Cir. 1952); Estate of Otte v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 301 (1972).
36. E.g., Ferry v. Rogan, 154 F.2d 974 (9th Cir. 1946); Rogan v. Kammerdiner, 140 F.2d 569
(9th Cir. 1944); Berkowitz v. Commissioner, 108 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1939); Richardson v. Helvering,
80 F.2d 548 (D.C. Cir. 1935).
37. See Berkowitz v. Commissioner, 108 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1939); Craig v. United States, 451
F. Supp. 378 (D.S.D. 1978). In Berkowitz the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Board
of Tax Appeals which searched for a partnership but failed to find one because there was no
written agreement. The court found a profit sharing agreement and partnership by relying on the
testimony of the survivor wife who said "we wanted to be partners, half and half." 108 F.2d at
321.
38. See Bushman v. United States, 8 F. Supp. 694 (Ct. Cl. 1934) (court found the only com-
pensation wife was expecting was love and affection of husband and did not consider services as
contribution), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 756 (1935); Estate of Awrey v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 222
(1945) (because there was no agreement and she had not paid income tax from her asset share,
court found she did not consider herself the owner of the joint interest).
39. E.g., Berkowitz v. Commissioner, 108 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1939) (couple worked together 43
years); Craig v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 378 (D.S.D. 1978) (couple worked together 43 years);
Estate of Otte v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 301 (1972) (couple worked together 35 years);
Estate of Guiliani v. Commissioner, I 1 T.C.M. (CCH) 673 (1952) (couple worked together a life-
time). But see Estate of Awrey v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 222 (1945) (wife worked in business for
several years but not during time period when business had most growth; services not allowed as
consideration).
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well as whether each worked equally hard in the business.40
The Tax Court on one occasion determined that domestic services of
the wife did not constitute consideration.4' The Tax Court, reaffirming
this position, has clearly stated that for a wife's work to be considera-
tion, the services must be related to the business and the services must
be other than those of an ordinary housewife.42
Congress promulgated a statutory exception to the "consideration
furnished" test in the Tax Reform Act of 1976 by enacting sections
2040(b) and 2040(d).43 A qualified joint interest" in property, under
40. E.g., Estate of Guiliani v. Commissioner, 11 T.C.M. (CCH) 673 (1952) (court found
wife's services in connection with business were at least equal in earning value to husband's). But
Cf Estate of Ehret v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1432 (1976) (because wife took care of
children, Commissioner's determination that wife's contribution was 20% rather than one-half was
upheld).
41. See Estate of Loveland v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 5 (1949).
42. See Estate of Otte v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 301 (1972). For a thorough dis-
cussion urging domestic services be accepted as consideration see generally Note, supra note 1.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin followed the ruling in Otte in interpreting 2040(a). In re Estate
of Kersten, 71 Wis. 2d 757, 239 N.W.2d 86 (1976). For a discussion that Kersten should not open
the door for treating domestic services as consideration see Term of the Wisconsin Supreme Court
(August 1975-August 1976), 60 MARQ. L. Rv. 512 (1976).
43. I.R.C. §§ 2040(b) and (d) are not directly related to the problem addressed in this Note
but are significant in the development of the law ofjoint tenancies. The subsections are as follows:
(b) CERTAIN JOINT INTERESTS OF HUSBAND AND WIFE.-
(1) INTERESTS OF SPOUSE EXCLUDED FROM GROSS EsTATE.-Notwithstanding sub-
section (a), in the case of any qualified joint interest, the value included in the gross
estate with respect to such interest by reason of this section is one-half of the value of
such qualified joint interest.
(2) QUALIFIED JOINT INTEREST DEFINED.-For purposes of paragraph (1), the term
"qualified joint interest" means any interest in property held by the decedent, and the
decedent's spouse as joint tenants or as tenants by the entirety, but only if-
(A) such joint interest was created by the decedent, the decedent's spouse, or both,
(B)(i) in the case of personal property, the creation of such joint interest consti-
tuted in whole or in part a gift for purposes of chapter 12, or
(ii) in the case of real property, an election under section 2515 applies with re-
spect to the creation of such joint interest, and
(C) in the case of a joint tenancy, only the decedent and the decedent's spouse are
joint tenants.
(d) JOINT INTERESTS OF HUSBAND AND WIFE CREATED BEFORE 1977.-Under regula-
tions prescribed by the Secretary-
(1) IN GENERAL.-In the case of any joint interest created before January 1, 1977,
which (if created after December 31, 1976) would have constituted a qualifiedjoint inter-
est under subsection (b)(2) (determined without regard to clause (ii) of subsection
(b)(2)(B)), the donor may make an election under this subsection to have paragraph (1)
of subsection (b) apply with respect to such joint interest.
(2) Tumt FOR MAKING ELECTION.-An election under this subsection with respect to
any property shall be made for the calendar quarter in 1977, 1978, or 1979 selected by
the donor in a gift tax return filed within the time prescribed by law for filing a gift tax
Washington University Open Scholarship
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these sections, is treated as belonging fifty percent to each spouse for
estate tax purposes. These subsections present the taxpayer with the
advantage of avoiding the "consideration furnished" test by electing
the "fractional interest" rule. Only one-half of the value of the joint
tenancy property is included in the donor spouse's estate if he is the
first to die, but the other one-half was a taxable gift at the creation of
the joint tenancy. The lifetime gift is generally not advantageous ex-
cept for the $3,000 annual exclusion and post-gift appreciation in prop-
erty.45 A potential triple exposure to taxation of qualified joint prop-
erty can result if the donee spouse dies first. This triple exposure
problem results from the property being subject to taxation at the crea-
tion of the joint tenancy; subject to taxation at the death of the donee
return for such quarter. Such an election may be made irrespective of whether or not the
amount involved exceeds the exclusion provided by section 2503(b); but no election may
be made under this subsection after the death of the donor.
(3) TAx EFFECTS OF ELECTION.-In the case of any property with respect to which
an election has been made under this subsection, for purposes of this title-
(A) the donor shall be treated as having made a gift at the close of the calendar
quarter selected under paragraph (2), and
(B) the amount of the gift shall be determined under paragraph (4).
(4) AMOUNT OF GiFT.-For purposes of paragraph (3)(B), the amount of any gift is
one-half of the amount-
(A) which bears the same ratio to the excess of (i) the value of the property on the
date of the deemed making of the gift under paragraph (3)(A), over (ii) the value of
such property on the date of the creation of the joint interest, as
(B) the excess of (i) the consideration furnished by the donor at the time of the
creation of the joint interest, over (ii) the consideration furnished at such time by the
donor's spouse, bears to the total consideration furnished by both spouses at such
time.
(5) SPECIAL RULE FOR PARAGRAPH (4)(A).-For purposes of paragraph (4)(A)-
(A) in the case of real property, if the creation was not treated as a gift at the time
of the creation, or
(B) in the case of personal property, if the gift was required to be included on a
gift tax return but was not so included, and the period of limitations on assessment
under section 6501 has expired with respect to the tax (if any) on such gift,
then the value of the property on the date of the creation of the joint interest shall be
treated as zero.
(6) SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENTS.-For purposes of this subsection, a substantial
improvement of any property shall be treated as the creation of a separate joint interest.
44. An interest is a qualified joint interest if the following are satisfied: (1) The interest must
have been created by the decedent, his spouse, or both; (2) in the case of personal property, the
creation of the joint interest must have been a completed gift for purposes of the gift tax provi-
sions; (3) in the case of personal property, the donor must have elected to treat the creation of the
joint tenancy as a taxable event at the time; and (4) the joint tenants cannot be persons other than
the decedent and his spouse. I.R.C. § 2040(b)(2). Joint tenancies existing before 1977 may be
severed and recreated into qualified joint interests. I.R.C. § 2040(d).
45. See Uchtmann, supra note 7, at 401.
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46spouse; and subject to taxation at the later death of the donor spouse.
Qualified joint interests do nothing to alleviate the unnecessarily
large gross estate of the second joint tenant.47 One commentator, after
weighing the advantages and disadvantages of the "fractional interest"
rule, concluded that, even when the joint tenancies are qualified joint
interests under section 2040(b), property owners should avoid large
joint tenancy holdings as a general rule and should terminate many
existing joint tenancies.48
States vary in their estate and inheritance treatment of jointly owned
property. Twenty-one states treat property held jointly by spouses in
the same manner as 2040(a).49 Twenty-one states' ° and the District of
46. Whether the gift tax paid by the donor spouse when the joint tenancy was created could
be applied against the tentative estate tax of the donee spouse is questionable because I.R.C.
§ 2001(b)(2) only allows a deduction for gift taxes payable with respect to gifts made by decedent.
See Uchtmann, supra note 7, at 401.
47. The right of survivorship necessarily requires inclusion of the property in the survivor's
gross estate. See Campfield, supra note 1, at 688-89; Dean, supra note 19, at 870-72; Hines, supra
note 1, at 599.
48. A general exception to this is joint tenancies created for convenience, such as joint owner-
ship of a home. See Uchtmann, supra note 7, at 402.
49. Seven states simply compute their tax on the basis of the federal estate tax liability so that
section 2040 is, in effect, being applied. ALA. CODE § 40-15-2 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 43.31.011
(1977); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 198.02 (West 1971); GA. CODE ANN. § 91A-5702(b) (1980); N.Y. TAX
LAw § 954 (McKinney 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-7 (1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-37-02
(1972 & Supp. 1980). Fourteen states have express provisions similar to section 2040. ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 63-103 (1947); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1305 (1974); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-1501 (1977);
MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 65, § 1 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1978) (value of family residence is excluded);
MINN. STAT. § 291.01(4) (1967) (where property was acquired prior to 1935, only one-half the
value is taxed); Miss. CODE ANN. § 27-9-7(3)(b) (1972); NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2002 (1971); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 54:34-1 (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 807(A)(4) (West 1966 & Supp. 1980);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-22-7(6) (1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-12-5 (1953) (except that, for the first
$40,000, one-half the value of the property is excluded); VA. CODE ANN. § 58-152(5) (1974); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 72.12(6) (1969 & Supp. 1980); Wyo. STAT. § 39-337 (1957).
50. See CoLO. REv. STAT. § 39-23-106 (1973) (value of property is divided by number of
present owners, except that for bank accounts value is determined by decedent's contribution);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-343 (1979) (value of property is divided by number of joint owners);
HAWAII REv. STAT. § 236-3 (1976) (one-half the value is taxed); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 375(5)
(Smith-Hurd 1974) (value of property is divided by the number of joint owners); IOWA CODE
§ 450.3(5) (1966) (one-half the value is taxed); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 140.050 (Baldwin 1977)
(one-half the value is taxed); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 3632 (1964) (value of property is
divided by number of joint owners); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 91-4405 (1947 & Supp. 1977)
(value of property is divided by number of joint owners; additional exclusion allowed if survivor
can prove contribution greater than one-half); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 86:8, 86:9 (1970 & Supp.
1979) (treated as tenants in common); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-2(7) (1979) (one-half the value of
property held as tenants by the entirety is taxed; no provision for joint tenancy); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 5731.10(B) (Page 1973) (one-half the value of the property is taxed); OR. REV. STAT.
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Columbia51 impose a tax on only one-half the value of jointly held
property. Seven states impose no tax52 and one state determines the tax
by the contribution of decedent rather than the survivor.53
II. OPERATION OF SECTION 2040(c)
Congress enacted section 2040(c)54 to insure that services provided
§ 118.010 (1979) (one-half the value of property held as tenants by the entirety is taxed; the provi-
sion for joint tenancies is similar to section 2040); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 10-40-9 (1967) (one-
half the value is taxed); W. VA. CODE § 11-1-1(d) (1974) (one-half the value is taxed). In seven
of the community property states (Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, New Mexico, Texas, and
Washington) only one-half the value of the community property is taxed on the death of a spouse.
The remaining community property state, Nevada, has no estate or inheritance tax. NEV. CONST.
art. X, § 1. See Note, supra note 1, at 635-36.
51. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1602 (1973) (value of the property divided by the number of
joint owners).
52. See IND. CODE § 6-4.1-3-7 (1976); MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 151 (1980); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 205.202 (1970) (as construed in In re Renz's Estate, 338 Mich. 347, 61 N.W.2d 148 (1953));
Mo. REv. STAT. § 145.020 (1978); NEV. CONST. art. X, § 1; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 2485-311
(Purdon 1964); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 6543(b) (1970).
53. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-1603 (1977 & Supp. 1980) (in the absence of evidence of the
decedent's contribution, the value of the property is divided by the number of joint owners).
54. I.R.C. § 2040(c) states:
(C) VALUE WHERE SPOUSE OF DECEDENT MATERIALLY PARTICIPATED IN FARM OR
OTHER BUSINESS-
(1) IN GENERAL.-Notwithstanding subsection (a), in the case of an eligible joint
interest in section 2040(c) property, the value included in the gross estate with respect to
such interest by reason of this section shall be-
(A) the value of such interest, reduced by
(B) the sum of-
(i) the section 2040(c) value of such interest, and
(ii) the adjusted consideration furnished by decedent spouse.
(2) LimrrATIONS.-
(A) AT LEAST 50 PERCENT OF VALUE TO BE INCLUDED.-Paragraph (1) shall in no
event result in the inclusion in the decedent's gross estate of less than 50 per-
cent of the value of the eligible joint interest.
(B) AGGREGATE REDUCTION.-The aggregate decrease in the value of the dece-
dent's gross estate resulting from the application of this subsection shall not
exceed $500,000.
(C) AGGREGATE ADJUSTED CONSIDERATION MUST BE LESS THAN VALUE.-Par-
agraph (1) shall not apply if the sum of-
(i) the adjusted consideration furnished by the decedent, and
(ii) the adjusted consideration furnished by the decedent's spouse, equals or
exceeds the value of the interest.
(3) ELIGIBLE JOINT INTEREST DEFINED.-For purposes of paragraph (1), the term
"eligible joint interest" means any interest in property held by the decedent and the
decedent's spouse as joint tenants or as tenants by the entirety, but only if-
(A) such joint interest was created by the decedent, the decedent's spouse, or both,
and
(B) in the case of a joint tenancy, only the decedent and the decedent's spouse are
joint tenants.
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by the decedent's spouse in the operation of a farm or other business
are treated as consideration for the purpose of diminishing the value of
the decedent's estate." Legislative history shows that the section's en-
actment had underpinnings in the Equal Rights Movement.5 6 Al-
though section 2040(c)'s thrust is to provide relief to farms or property
used for farming purposes, the statute also includes property used in
any other trade or business. 7
Generally, section 2040(c) provides that for each year, up to a maxi-
mum of twenty-five years, a surviving spouse has "materially partici-
(4) SECTION 2040(c) PROPERTY DEFINED.-For purposes of paragraph (1), the term
"section 2040(c) property" means any interest in any real or tangible personal property
which is devoted to use as a farm or used for farming purposes (within the meaning of
paragraphs (4) and (5) of section 2032(e)) or is used in any other trade or business.
(5) SECTION 2040(c) VALUE.-For purposes of paragraph (1), the term "section
2040(c) value" means-
(A) the excess of the value of the eligible joint interest over the adjusted considera-
tion furnished by the decedent, the decedent's spouse, or both, multiplied by
(B) 2 percent for each taxable year in which the spouse materially participated in
the operation of the farm or other trade or business but not to exceed 50 percent.
(6) ADJUSTED CONSIDERATIN.-For the purposes of this subsection, the term "ad-
justed consideration" means-
(A) the consideration furnished by the individual concerned (not taking into ac-
count any consideration in the form of income or gain from the business of which
the section 2040(c) property is a part) determined under rules similar to the rules set
forth in subsection (a), and
(B) an amount equal to the amount of interest which the consideration referred to
in subparagraph (A) would have earned over the period in which it was invested in
the farm or other business if it had been earning interest throughout such period at 6
percent simple interest.
(7) MATERIAL PARTICIPATION.-For purposes of paragraph (1), material participa-
tion shall be determined in a manner similar to the manner used for purposes of para-
graph (1) of section 1402(a) (relating to net earnings from self-employment).
(8) VALUE.-For purposes of this subsection, except where the context clearly indi-
cates otherwise, the term "value" means value determined without regard to this subsec-
tion.
(9) ELECTION To HAVE SUBSECTION APPLY.-This subsection shall apply with re-
spect to a joint interest only if the estate of the decedent elects to have this subsection
apply to such interest. Such an election shall be made not later than the time prescribed
by section 6075(a) for filing the return of tax imposed by section 2001 (including exten-
sions thereof), and shall be made in such manner as the Secretary shall by regulations
prescribe.
55. See H.R. REP. No. 1800, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 272 (1978).
56. In debate on the Senate floor, Senator Melcher of Montana who sponsored the amend-
ment stated, "If we believe in ERA, if we believe that women have an equal right to property, then
by all means the Senate should accept this unanimously." 124 CoNG. REc. S. 17,758 (daily ed.
Oct. 9, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Melcher).
57. See I.R.C. § 2040(c)(4). See also 124 CONG. REC. S. 17,758-59 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1978)
(remarks of Sen. Metzenbaum).
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pated"58 in the operation of a farm or other business, two percent of the
excess appreciation in value is deemed to belong to the surviving
spouse. Excess appreciation is the estate value of property less the orig-
inal consideration paid, less the amount the original consideration
would have earned over the time period if it had been earning six per-
cent simple interest. 9 Section 2040(c), which is simple in concept, is
more difficult in execution. The subsection applies to decedents dying
after 1978,60 and must be elected by the executor to apply.6 1 For a joint
interest to be eligible for treatment under the subsection the interest
must have been created by the decedent, his spouse, or both;62 decedent
and spouse must be the only joint tenants; 63 and the interest must be
one in any real or tangible personal property which is used as a farm or
for farming purpose or used in any other trade or business.64 The sub-
section applies limitations on the amount that decedent's estate may be
reduced. The decedent's interest cannot be reduced below fifty percent
of the value of the eligible joint interest nor can the aggregate amount
of the decedent's gross estate be reduced by more than $500,000.65
In determining the amount excluded from decedent's gross estate,
two factors come into play-section 2040(c) value66 and adjusted con-
sideration.6 7 Calculating the amount to be excluded can be accom-
plished by the following four steps:
(1) Calculate the percentage rate, which is the number of years spouse
materially participated in the farm or business multiplied by two
percent.
(2) Calculate the total adjusted consideration which is the sum of
(a) decedent's adjusted consideration, which consists of decedent's
original consideration plus assumed appreciation at rate of six
percent on decedent's original consideration, and
(b) surviving spouse's adjusted consideration, which consists of
58. For a discussion of the issues surrounding material participation see notes 92-95 infra and
accompanying text.
59. See Uchtmnn, Joint Tenancy Planning and Problem Solving, Including the 2% Rule Under
the RevenueAct of1978, ILL. INST. CONT. LEGAL EDUC., FARM ESTATE PLANNING AND BusINESS
ORGANIZATION (1979).
60. See H.R. REP. No. 1800, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 272 (1978).
61. See I.R.C. § 2040(c)(9).
62. See I.I.C. § 2040(c)(3).
63. Id.
64. See I.R.C. § 2040(c)(4).
65. See I.R.C. § 2040(c)(2).
66. See I.R.C. § 2040(c)(5).




surviving spouse's original consideration plus assumed appreci-
ation at rate of six percent on surviving spouse's original con-
sideration.
(3) Calculate the section 2040(c) value, which is the excess of the estate
value of the joint interest property over the total adjusted considera-
tion (from 2) multiplied by the percentage rate (from 1).
(4) Calculate the amount excluded from decedent's estate, which is the
section 2040(c) value (from 3) plus the surviving spouse's adjusted
consideration (from 2(b)).68
III. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 2040(c)
Congress enacted section 2040(c) as a reaction to courts' disparate
treatment of the contribution of the wife's work in the family busi-
ness.69  Section 2040(c) avoids differences in treatment of the wife's
services in cases that are substantially identical except for the fact that
some taxpayers had arranged their business in proper form.70 The ef-
68. An example may clarify the operation of the statute: John and Mary Farmer bought 100
acres of farmland in 1959 at the total price of $ 10,000. John furnished 75 percent of the considera-
tion and Mary 25 percent. The property was held in joint tenancy and used as a farm. John died
in 1979 at which time the property was valued at $75,000. Mary materially participated in the
farm until the time of John's death.
(I) Percentage rate is two percent x 20 years, or 40 percent.
(2) Total Adjusted Consideration is $22,000, computed:
(a) John's adjusted consideration is $16,500, or $7500 plus six percent x 20 years x
$7500.
(b) Mary's adjusted consideration is $5500, or $2500 plus six percent x 20 years x
$2500.
(3) Section 2040(c) value is $21,200, or [$75,000-$22,000] x 40 percent.
(4) Amount excluded from John's estate under 2040(c) is $26,700, or $21,200 (section
2040(c) value) plus $5500 (surviving spouse, Mary's, adjusted consideration)
69. See notes 25-42 supra, 97-124 infra and accompanying text. The Senate Finance Com-
mittee made the following comment on this line of cases:
In the case of certain trade or business activities conducted jointly in the form of a family
partnership, the partnership interest held by the surviving spouse will not be included in
the deceased spouse's gross estate. In this situation, because of the form chosen, the
effect is that the services performed by the surviving spouse in connection with the family
owned business are taken into account, by reason of the profit sharing ratio, as consider-
ation furnished for the purchase of jointly owned property used in the trade or business
if a partnership is used to conduct business.
S. REP. No. 1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 215 (1978).
70. See S. REP. No. 1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 215 (1978). The Senate Finance Committee
stated the reason for change:
The Committee believes that the performance of services by a wife in connection with
a jointly owned and operated farm or other business should be taken into account as
consideration furnished under the estate tax law. The committee believes that recogni-
tion of the wife's services in these cases is necessary to avoid differences in treatment for
cases which are substantially identical but for counseling to arrange the business opera-
Number 11
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fectiveness of section 2040(c) can best be examined by comparing a
hypothetical situation worked out under both section 2040(c) and
under the "consideration furnished" test. Section 2040(c) has greater
effect when the material participation period by the wife is longer and
the property has greatly appreciated. The following hypothetical ex-
emplifies this comparison:
Example 1(a). John and Mary Farmer bought farmland in 1970 that was
put into joint tenancy. John paid the purchase price of $25,000 in cash.
Mary "materially participated" in the farm for ten years, up until the time
of John's death in 1980. At John's death, the property had a value of
$100,000.
The amount included in John's estate under section 2040(a) is
$100,00071 as compared to $88,00072 under section 2040(c).
Example 1(b). Same as I(a) except the property was held for twenty-five
years during which Mary "materially participated." The farmland was
purchased in 1955 and had a value at John's death in 1980 of $200,000.
The amount included in John's estate under section 2040(a) is
$200,00073 as compared to $131,25074 under section 2040(c).
The initial observation from this example is that unless the apprecia-
tion in the property is greater than six percent, section 2040(c) will have
no effect. The first six percent of appreciation is viewed as a return of
capital and a result of inflation.7 5 Section 2040(c) has a substantial ef-
fect in Example I(b) when the "material participation" period is long
tion in a proper form, such as a family partnership, so that services by the wife are given
some recognition.
Id.
71. Because John provided all the consideration, the entire amount is included in his estate.
72. Compute as follows: (I) Percentage rate 10 years x two percent = 20 percent
(2) total adjusted consideration $40,000
(a) John's adjusted consideration $40,000, or $25,000 + [six percent x 10 years x $25,000]
(b) Mary's adjusted consideration 0
(3) section 2040(c) value is $12,000, or [$100,000-$40,000] x 20 percent
(4) amount excluded is $12,000
(5) amount included in John's estate $88,000, or [$100,000-$12,000]
73. Because John provided all the consideration, all $200,000 would be included in his estate.
74. Compute as follows: (1) Percentage rate 25 years x two percent = 50 percent
(2) total adjusted consideration $62,500
(a) John's adjusted consideration $62,500, or $25,000 + [six percent x 25 years x $25,000]
(b) Mary's adjusted consideration 0
(3) section 2040(c) value is $68,750, or [$200,000-$62,500] x 50 percent
(4) amount excluded $68,750
(5) amount included in John's estate is $131,250, or [$200,000 - $68,750]




and there has been great appreciation in the property. The effect is
much less substantial in Example I(a), however, in which the "material
participation" time period is shorter and appreciation in the property is
less.76
When the surviving wife has paid part of the initial consideration,
and there is a short material participation period, a more desirable re-
sult is obtained under section 2040(a).
Example 11(a). John and Mary Farmer bought farmland in 1970 that was
put into joint tenancy. John paid 75 percent and Mary paid 25 percent of
the purchase price. Purchase price was $25,000. Mary "materially partic-
ipated" in the farm for ten years, up until time of John's death in 1980.
At the time of John's death, the property was valued at $100,000.
In this example the amount included in John's estate under section
2040(a) is $75,00077 as compared to $78,000 s under section 2040(c).
Example 11(b). Same as Example II(a) except the "material participa-
tion" period is 25 years and the value at John's death is $200,000.
The amount included in John's estate under section 2040(a) is
$150,00079 as compared to $115,62580 under section 2040(c).
In Example II(a), electing section 2040(c) would result in higher taxes
and obviously would not be advisable. In comparing Examples I and
II, section 2040(c) has a more substantial effect when the surviving
spouse paid none of the initial consideration.
76. The positive effect of 2040(c) is further reduced by the marital deduction. If the estate
would be sufficiently large that the 50 percent marital deduction rule applies, the taxable estate
would actually be reduced by approximately one-half the amounts in Example I(a) and (b).
77. Because John contributed 75 percent of initial consideration, 75 percent of value at death
or $75,000 would be included in his estate.
78. Compute as follows: (1) Percentage rate 10 years x two percent = 20 percent
(2) total adjusted consideration $40,000
(a) John's adjusted consideration $30,000, or $18,750 + [six percent x 10 years x $18,750]
(b) Mary's adjusted consideration $10,000, or $6250 + [six percent x 10 years x $6250]
(3) section 2040(c) value is $12,000, or [$100,000-$40,000] x 20 percent
(4) amount excluded $22,000, or [$12,000+$10,000]
(5) amount included in John's estate $78,000, or [$100,000-$22,000]
79. Because John contributed 75 percent of initial consideration, 75 percent of value at death
or $150,000 would be included in his estate.
80. Compute as follows: (1) Percentage rate 25 years x two percent = 50 percent
(2) total adjusted consideration $62,500
(a) John's adjusted consideration $46,875, or $18,750 + [six percent x 25 years x $18,750]
(b) Mary's adjusted consideration $15,625, or $6250 + [six percent x 25 years x $6250]
(3) section 2040(c) value is $68,750, or [$200,000 - $62,500] x 50 percent
(4) amount excluded $84,375, or [$68,750 + $15,625]
(5) amount included in John's estate $115,625, or [$200,000 - $84,375]
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The next example is representative of a common means of purchas-
ing farm land-debt financing. In this situation, when there is also a
long period of material participation and great appreciation, 2040(c)
renders the most favorable result.
Example 111(a). John and Mary Farmer bought farmland in 1970 that
was put in joint tenancy. Purchase price was $25,000 of which John paid
$5,000 down in cash. The remaining $20,000 was financed through a
mortgage upon which both John and Mary were liable. The mortgage
was paid out of the profits from the farm business. Mary "materially par-
ticipated" in the farm for ten years, up until John's death in 1980. At the
time of John's death, the farmland was valued at $100,000.
The amount included in John's estate under section 2040(a) is
$60,00081 as compared to $81,60082 under section 2040(c).
Example 111(b). Same as Example III(a) except Mary "materially partici-
pated" for 25 years and the value at John's death was $200,000.
The amount included in John's estate under section 2040(a) is
$120,00083 as compared to $106,25084 under section 2040(c).
As Examples III(a) and (b) demonstrate, section 2040(c) does not
81. Under the case law, see notes 22-24 supra, John is credited with providing one-half the
value of the mortgage, or $10,000. $10,000 + $5000 of original consideration means that the hus-
band, theoretically, may be credited with $15,000 or $25,000 or 60 percent of consideration paid
for the property. Sixty percent of $100,000 is $60,000.
The $15,000 figure represents the $5,000 of original consideration plus one-half the value of the
mortgage that the husband theoretically contributed. There is no allowance for appreciation in
the value of the property. The $25,000 figure includes the original contribution plus the entire
value of the outstanding mortgage at the time of purchase. There is no provision for the widow's
contribution or appreciation in the value of the property between the time of purchase and the
husband's death. The $60,000 figure represents that fraction of the fair market value of the prop-
erty at the husband's death that the husband is considered to have contributed. (($15,000 +
$25,000) x 100,000).
82. Compute as follows: (1) Percentage rate 10 years x two percent = 20 percent
(2) total adjusted consideration $8000
(a) John's adjusted consideration $8000, or $5000 + [six percent x 10 years x $5000]
(b) Mary's adjusted consideration 0
(3) section 2040(c) value is $18,400, or [$100,000 - $8000] x 20 percent
(4) amount excluded $18,400
(5) amount included in John's estate $81,600, or [$100,000 - $18,400]
83. Sixty percent of $200,000 value is $120,000. See note 81 supra.
84. Compute as follows: (1) Percentage rate 25 years x two percent = 50 percent
(2) total adjusted consideration $12,500.
(a) John's adjusted consideration $12,500, or $5000 + [six percent x 25 years x $5000]
(b) Mary's adjusted consideration 0
(3) section 2040(c) value is $93,750, or [$200,000 - $12,500] x 50 percent
(4) amount excluded $93,750
(5) amount included in John's estate $106,250, or [$200,000 - $93,750]
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treat income from the business of which the section 2040(c) property is
a part as consideration.85 The mortgage payments are not taken into
account in determining adjusted consideration because they are made
with income from the property. This seems to ignore the case law,
which holds that payment of a joint obligation is comprised of equal
contributions by each spouse.86 If the mortgage payments were consid-
ered in the adjusted consideration, there would be a slight advantage
for the surviving wife because the husband's estate would be reduced.8 7
There are several unresolved issues, however, in interpreting section
2040(c). In section 2040(c) the parenthetical phrase in the definition of
adjusted consideration "not taking into account any consideration in
the form of income or gain from the business of which the section
2040(c) property is a part"88 presents a serious problem. It is unclear
whether this phrase overrules the case law that recognizes uninvested
income derived from jointly owned property as independent considera-
tion furnished by the surviving wife. 9 Future regulations could state
that when a wife withdraws income from the jointly owned property,
pays income tax, and reinvests the proceeds, the reinvestment repre-
sents independent consideration furnished by the wife.90 An adverse
ruling in the regulations would be a greater incentive to demonstrate an
agreement to share profits through which the spouse's reinvested in-
come could be traded.9'
A second problem concerns the definition of material participation.
For the wife's work to be recognized under section 2040(c), she must
materially participate in the farm or business.92 The subsection says
that material participation shall be determined in a manner similar to
the manner used with regard to net earnings from self-employment.93
The regulations under section 1402(a), dealing with the self-employ-
ment tax, indicate that material participation means engaging to a ma-
terial degree in the physical work required to produce crops or
85. See I.R.C. § 2040(c)(6)(A).
86. See notes 22-24 supra.
87. In determining the amount included in husband's estate under 2040(c) the amount in
Ill(a) would be $72,000 and the amount in 1II(b) would be $105,750. These are derived by allo-
cating $ 10,000 of initial consideration to the wife and $15,000 to the husband.
88. I.R.C. § 2040(c)(6)(A).
89. See notes 20-41 supra and accompanying text.
90. See Sugar, supra note 20, at 271.
91. See notes 25-42 supra.
92. See I.R.C. § 2040(c)(7).
93. Id.
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commodities9 4 or in the management of the production of the crops or
commodities.95 Because the Code links the material participation re-
quirement to self-employment taxes, the question arises whether the
wife is required to have paid the self-employment tax to have "materi-
ally participated" in the farm and thereby to qualify for section 2040(c)
treatment. 96 Furthermore, the method of substantiating "material par-
ticipation" is as yet uncertain.97
Section 2040(c) property is limited to real property or tangible per-
sonal property.9" Section 2040(c) has no relevance for the husband and
wife who, in joint tenancy, own the stock of a closely held corporation.
Section 2040(c) would not apply, therefore, if an incorporated farm is
bought by the husband, the stock of the corporation transferred to the
husband and wife in joint tenancy, and then farmed by the couple.
Section 2040(c) is an estate tax provision. To recognize the wife's
contribution in the inter vivos severing of a joint tenancy raises the
argument as to whether the two percent material participation rule
should be extended to section 2515 of the Gift Tax Code. Because sec-
tion 2040(c) applies only to estates, couples may hesitate in their later
94. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-4(b)(3) (1956) (amended T.D. 7710, 1980-36 I.R.B. 12, for
farming operations). The regulations indicate that such activities as the actual work of planting,
cultivating, harvesting crops, feeding, and caring for livestock would satisfy the requirement. Id.
For further reference to the definition of material participation see 4 N. HAt., AGRICULTURAL
LAW § 37.03[3] (1980); Uchtmann & Carpenter, The Retiring Farmer's Dilemma, 2 AGR. L.J. 125
(1980).
95. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-4(b)(3) (1956) (amended T.D. 7710, 1980-36 I.R.B. 12, for
farming operations). The regulations indicate that the requirement is satisfied by such activities as
making decisions relating to production, such as when to plant, cultivate, dust, spray or harvest
the crop, and including consulting and advising, inspecting, making decisions as to matters of
rotation of crops, the type of crops to be grown, the type of livestock to be raised, and the type of
implements and machinery to be used. .d.
96. A strong argument can be made that the applicability of section 2040(c) should not hinge
on whether the wife has paid self-employment tax. The self-employment tax due would not be
substantial. Further, compliance with self-employment tax should not determine if an elective
estate tax provision may apply.
97. I.R.C. § 2023A(b), which deals with special valuation methods of farmland for estate tax
purposes, also requires the material participation standard to be met.
The regulations under this section state that payment of self-employment tax is not conclusive
as to the presence of material participation. If no self-employment taxes have been paid, material
participation is presumed not to have occurred unless it can be shown that material participation
did in fact occur and the IRS is informed of the reason why no such tax was paid. All such self-
employment taxes (including interest and penalties) determined to be due must be paid. Treas.
Reg. § 20.203A-3(e)(1) (1980). This same standard will probably be set out in the regulations
under § 2040(c).
98. See I.R.C. § 2040(c)(4).
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years to sever the joint tenancies99 by sale or for estate planning be-
cause the services of the wife would not be given credit as consideration
furnished unless the property passes through an estate. t°
IV. JUDICIAL ALTERNATIVE TO SECTION 2040(c)
Courts also have recognized the farm wife's services as consideration
toward the jointly held property. These cases could lead the taxpayer
to a more favorable result than obtainable under section 2040(c). Es-
tate of Otte v. Commissioner exemplifies a common factual situation.10'
The husband bought 105 acres of land before the couple's marriage.
He made a downpayment and assumed a mortgage on the balance. 0 2
This property was later transferred to him and his wife in tenancy by
the entirety. The profits from the initial 105 acres were put back to buy
other farmland, machinery, and livestock. 103 The husband and wife
worked together on the farm for forty-three years, during which time
their acreage grew to 639 acres held in tenancy by the entirety and
considerable holdings of other tangible personal property owned
jointly."
The amount of the original property includible in the decedent hus-
band's estate, under this fact situation and section 2040(c), would be
determined similar to Example I above.' 5 To determine the amount of
the remaining property includible in the husband's estate, the down-
payment made by the husband from profits on the original 105 acres
would be credited as consideration furnished by him because income
from section 2040(c) property cannot be allowed as consideration by
99. Under I.R.C. § 2515(b) in the case of the termination of a joint tenancy in real property,
other than because of the death of a spouse, a spouse is treated as having made a gift to the extent
that the proportion of the total consideration furnished by such spouse multiplied by the proceeds
of such termination exceeds the value of the proceeds of termination received by such spouse.
100. For example, farmland is bought by the husband, put into joint tenancy and farmed by
the couple. Later in life the couple would like to incorporate their farming business for estate
planning reasons. At the time the property is transferred from the couple to the corporation there
will be a taxable gift to the wife unless the husband receives stock equal to the value of all the
property. Because the transfer of property takes place while both spouses are alive, the wife's
services are not credited as consideration even though she may have "materially participated" in
the farm for twenty-five years before the land was transferred to the closely held corporation. See
I.R.C. § 2515(b); note 98 supra.
101. 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 301 (1972). See notes 25-42 supra.
102. Id. at 302.
103. Id. at 302-05.
104. Id.
105. See notes 72, 74 supra.
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the spouse."° Thus, the result would be similar to that in Example III
above. 107 The size of the decedent husband's estate, under section
2040(c), would be considerably larger than the Tax Court's determina-
tion in Otte because the court included only one-half of all joint prop-
erty.108 The court, applying section 2040(a), determined that by
working as a husband and wife team in the farming activities, the wife
had contributed full and adequate consideration in money or money's
worth.10 9
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reached the same result in In re
Estate of Kersten,"1 citing Otte and applying section 2040(a), which
was adopted as part of the Wisconsin inheritance tax,"' to a fact pat-
tern similar to Otte.112 In another farm widow case, Craig v. United
States,"3 the court found a partnership and included only one-half of
the personal property involved in the farming operation in the decedent
husband's estate.114 A more thorough look at these cases is warranted
because of the more desirable result obtained for the surviving wife in
these decisions than to the result under section 2040(c).
In Craig, 115 Otte,"16 and Kersten117 virtually all of the property in
controversy was acquired over the years by borrowing and paying back
out of farm earnings. The activities of the wife were in excess of those
of a housewife discharging ordinary domestic responsibilities."' Phys-
ical activities of the wife included caring for livestock, helping with the
milking, and operating a tractor during baling season.1 9 Most impor-
106. See notes 87-90 supra and accompanying text.
107. See notes 81, 83 supra and accompanying text.
108. See 31 T.C.M. (CCH) at 305.
109. Id.
110. 71 Wis. 2d 757, 763-64, 239 N.W.2d 86, 90 (1976). See also note 42 Jupra.
I11. See Wis. STAT. 72.12(6)(a) (1971).
112. In Kersten the husband purchased the first 40 acres of land from which the farming oper-
ation was built. The couple worked together 33 years until the husband's death. 71 Wis. 2d at
758-59, 239 N.W.2d at 87-88.
113. 451 F. Supp. 378 (D.S.D. 1978). See also United States v. Neel, 235 F.2d 395 (10th Cir.
1967); notes 34-39 supra.
114. 451 F. Supp. at 383. In Craig the husband had a small tract of land and small bank
account at the time of their marriage. From this money and the income off the land, other land
and farming assets were purchased. Id. at 379-80. See note 37 supra.
115. 451 F. Supp. at 380.
116. 31 T.C.M. (CCH) at 302-05.
117. 71 Wis. 2d at 759, 239 N.W.2d at 87-88.
118. 31 T.C.M. (CCH) at 307.
119. 71 Wis. 2d at 759, 239 N.W.2d at 88.
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tantly, the court in Craig said the wife contributed management skills
and had an equal voice with her husband in all major decisions in the
farm operation. 2
0
In Otte the Commissioner argued that the wife's exact money must
be traced through each change in property. 121 The Tax Court dis-
agreed: "[A]Ii available funds arising from the joint efforts of the par-
ties were invested in the property in controversy . . . which
convincingly shows that petitioner's contributions represented 'an ade-
quate and full consideration in money or money's worth.' "122 If sec-
tion 2040(c) applied, it would be necessary to trace funds to the source
of the down payment and the mortgage payments to determine ad-
justed consideration.' 23 Whether these cases are valid after section
2040(c) is as yet unanswered. Because an election is necessary for sec-
tion 2040(c) to apply, there is a strong argument that the surviving wife
should be able to determine the amount excludible under section
2040(c) and then, if advantageous, argue Otte and section 2040(a) or
Craig and family partnership. 24
V. CONCLUSION
The long time discriminatory treatment of the surviving wife's inter-
est in joint tenancy properties ignored the realities of the normal family
farm where husband and wife work equally hard to earn a living. They
view themselves as partners in all aspects of the marriage, including the
financial aspect, and their property is acquired by their mutual efforts.
Section 2040(c) serves in a limited capacity to remedy this discrimi-
nation. A careful analysis must still be made tracing the funds of each
spouse to determine if a more desirable tax result may be attained for
the widow under the "consideration furnished" test. The Otte or Craig
remedies may be pursued if the fact situation is applicable and there is
a large enough amount in controversy to make it feasible. Because of
its elective character, section 2040(c) offers surviving joint tenants a
120. 451 F. Supp. at 381. Note the similarity in the characterization of the wife's activities in
these cases to the requirement of material participation. See notes 93-94 supra.
121. 31 T.C.M. (CCH) at 308.
122. Id.
123. See Example III, notes 81-84 supra and accompanying text.
124. But see notes 69-70 supra. The Otte theory may be used to recognize the wife's work as
contribution in the severing of joint tenancies under § 2515(b).
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greater range of options from which to select the most favorable tax
consequences.
S. Gene Schwarm
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